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Abstract
Adversarial examples have recently proven to be able
to fool deep learning methods by adding carefully crafted
small perturbation to the input space image. In this paper,
we study the possibility of generating adversarial examples
for code-based iris recognition systems. Since generating
adversarial examples requires back-propagation of the ad-
versarial loss, conventional filter bank-based iris-code gen-
eration frameworks cannot be employed in such a setup.
Therefore, to compensate for this shortcoming, we propose
to train a deep auto-encoder surrogate network to mimic the
conventional iris code generation procedure. This trained
surrogate network is then deployed to generate the adver-
sarial examples using the iterative gradient sign method al-
gorithm [15]. We consider non-targeted and targeted at-
tacks through three attack scenarios. Considering these at-
tacks, we study the possibility of fooling an iris recognition
system in white-box and black-box frameworks.
1. Introduction
Biometric systems are widely deployed in many recogni-
tion and security applications. Iris images provide the most
reliable human identification trait, since, due to the chaotic
morphogenesis involved in the formation of the iris pattern,
there is a very large variability of iris patterns among dif-
ferent persons [8]. Additionally, although externally visi-
ble, the iris is thought to be relatively stable over the time
since it is well-protected as an internal organ. However, the
recognition performance of raw iris images can be reduced
in imaging instances that include cases such as light reflec-
tions from the eye’s surface, occlusions and fluctuations of
perspective, and illumination [30].
The majority of iris recognition systems generate the iris
template from the eye image. This process consists of filters
such as 2-D Gabor and wavelets. The binarized iris template
is considered as the iris-code, which removes the unwanted
amplitude information. Furthermore, storing the iris-code
in the database is more secure than the actual eye image,
since the eye image can provide sensitive information, in-
Figure 1: (a) Normalized iris image, (b) normalized mask,
and (c) the corresponding iris code generated using [14].
cluding health data, about the subjects. In addition, storing
only the iris-code is sufficient for future identity verification
attempts [32]. However, iris biometric recognition systems
are vulnerable to a diverse set of attacks [20]. Presentation
attacks on iris recognition systems are well-studied in the
biometrics literature [21]. These attacks undermine the per-
formance of a recognition system by presenting biometrics
that are similar to those of an authorized user.
Adversarial examples, introduced in [15], are samples of
input data modified such that machine learning classifiers
are fooled. While, in many cases, these modifications are
perceptually indistinguishable and cannot be noticed by a
human observer [15, 4]. Adversarial examples can be uti-
lized to conceal the identity of a subject or fool the secu-
rity system to provide access to an unauthorized subject by
matching the adversarial example to a specific or any other
authorized subject. Adversarial examples are considered se-
curity threats since an adversarial example that is designed
to be misclassified by one model is often also misclassified
by the other models [3]. Therefore, adversarial examples
can be generated without the exact knowledge of the recog-
nition framework. The majority of the attacks applied on
iris are done in the iris code domain [22]. However, spatial
correlation between the adjacent locations in the iris and the
nature of the filters used in iris-template generation, result
in correlation between iris-code bits [9, 12]. Therefore, the
modification of the bits in the iris-code domain does not
necessarily represent a real physical iris image.
The authors in [22] have tried to solve this problem by al-
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tering the unstable bits. They defined the unstable bits as the
bits between consecutive 1-bit and 0-bit sequences. How-
ever, this cannot be an optimal solution, since depending on
the filters used in iris template generation, this correlation
can occur in adjacent bits, non-adjacent bits, or even non-
adjacent rows. For example, when the template generation
process consists of a bank of Gabor filters [14], locations
far away from each other can be highly correlated. There-
fore, altering the bits in the iris-code may result in a code
that does not represent an actual iris. On the other hand, al-
though there are attempts to generate the natural iris image
from a given iris code using evolutionary algorithms [10],
this is a very complex task since, theoretically, it is impos-
sible to generate the iris image from the iris code [6].
In this paper, we make the following contributions: i) we
mimic the iris-code generation filter bank procedure with a
surrogate deep network, ii) the surrogate deep network is
differentiable with respect to its parameters and its input,
which is then used to generate adversarial examples, iii) the
possibility of generating adversarial irises when the attacker
is provided only with a partial knowledge of the iris recog-
nition model is investigated, and iv) several attack scenar-
ios are examined for non-targeted and targeted frameworks.
The non-targeted frameworks investigate the possibility of
fooling the iris recognition system not to recognize the iden-
tity of the subject. While, in the targeted framework the
attacker attempts to represent a specific subject.
2. Related Works
2.1. Iris Code
The iris modality is among the most promising biometric
features that illustrates high-performance with a reasonable
confidence level. The majority of iris recognition systems
utilize the iris template generated from the eye image. How-
ever, the performance of iris recognition systems become
limited when the amplitude of the iris template is consid-
ered in the recognition algorithm, because the amplitude
is sensitive to the light reflections, occlusions, illumination
change. Therefore, most of the iris recognition frameworks
in practice are based on the phase information [30], where
to bypass the amplitude effect, the iris template is binarized.
Binarizing the iris template, which is refereed to as the iris-
code, removes the effect of the amplitude information.
The iris-code is generally constructed through segmenta-
tion, mask generation, normalization, and binerization. To
generate the iris-code, the eye image is segmented to find
the iris image to identify the area of interest. Segmentation
is performed by finding the pupillary and the limbus bound-
aries of the iris. The mask image is then generated using the
segmented eye image. In the binary mask, the ones repre-
sent the iris. This binary mask is used during the matching
step in order to ignore noisy pixels and the pixels that do
not belong to the iris. The iris and mask images are then
normalized into a rectangular shape following rubber sheet
model [8]. The normalized iris image is finally converted
to an iris template through multiple levels of 2-D Gabor
or wavelets filters. To generate the iris-code, the iris tem-
plate is binarized. The iris-code is used in combination with
the normalized mask image to verify or classify the iris im-
ages. In the authentication or recognition phase, iris-codes
are compared using bit-based metrics such as Hamming dis-
tance. Several prominent iris authentication frameworks are
built through this general framework [8, 30, 14, 16]. Fig-
ure 1 presents a normalized iris image, the corresponding
normalized mask, and the corresponding iris-code gener-
ated using algorithm described in [14].
2.2. Iris Presentation Attacks
Presentation attacks make a fake presentation to the sen-
sor in order to fool the recognition system and cause it to
make an incorrect decision [6]. In this scenario, the attacker
needs the subject’s iris image, iris code, or equivalent in-
formation. Presentation attack technologies can coarsely
be categorized into technologies associated with artifacts
and the actual eye. Well-known examples of the first cat-
egory are paper printouts, textured contact lenses, displays,
and prosthetic eyes. The second category includes attacks
such as non-conformant use, cadavers, and coercion. Pa-
per printouts refer to a printed artifact. In this attack, a
hole is cut in the area where the pupil is printed to mimic
the reflections typically created capturing an iris image us-
ing a camera or illuminator system [17]. Textured contact
lenses are manufactured to have a visual texture. The au-
thors of [2] have shown that, not only the textured contact
lenses, but also the clear contact lenses with no visible tex-
ture can fool iris recognition systems. Screens can be uti-
lized to display an iris image or video to the sensor as a
presentation attack [11]. Prosthetic eyes, although requir-
ing a huge amount of time and expertise, have proved to be
successful spoofs [6].
Presentation attack detection algorithms are coarsely
categorized into hardware-and software-based solutions.
Hardware-based solutions add additional components to the
sensor to detect attacks to the sensor. Although these frame-
works present better performance, they are more expensive
compared to the software-based techniques [21]. Addition-
ally, software-based approaches are more convenient since
they are non-invasive, fast, and user-friendly. These tech-
niques identify the attacked image after it is captured by an-
alyzing its statistical characteristics. On the other hand, the
attack detection algorithms can consider the iris as a static
or dynamic object [6], while these algorithms can include
inducing changes to the iris image.
Figure 2: Iris code generation: The normalized iris image and the normalized mask are concatenated in depth as the input to
the iris code surrogate deep network, while, the output is forced to mimic the iris code by minimizing the reconstruction loss.
2.3. Adversarial Attacks
Recently, deep learning models have outperformed the
classical machine learning models in a variety of application
areas, including biometrics [26, 27, 25]. However, these
models are vulnerable to a small perturbation in the input
image. These small perturbations cannot typically be no-
ticed by a human observer but can still alter the predictions
of the model. Adversarial attacks [15] attempt to generate
adversarial samples, that are very similar to the benign sam-
ples, which are misclassified by the classifier [15, 4]. When
used to attack a biometric security system, these attacks can
conceal the identity of a subject or fool the security system
to give access to an unauthorized subject.
Adversarial attacks are generally categorized based on
the perturbation type they utilize. The authors in [29] in-
troduced a L-BFGS method to generate one of the first ad-
versarial attacks. Although computationally expensive, this
method is able to fool deep networks trained on different
inputs [7]. The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [15] is
a fast and efficient attack based on the sign of the gradient
of the classification loss with respect to the input sample as
the perturbation. Several extensions to this attack are de-
veloped in the literature. The authors in [24] have proposed
to use the gradient value instead of the gradient sign to in-
crease the effectiveness of the attack. Utilizing a Jacobian
matrix of the prediction of classes with regards to the input
pixels is considered in [18] to reduce the number of pixels
that are needed to be altered during the attack by calculat-
ing the saliency map of the input space. Although this at-
tack requires a very small number of pixels to be modified,
saliency-based methods are computationally expensive due
to the greedy search for finding the most significant areas
in the input sample. In conclusion, these attacks manipulate
the classifier by adding high-frequency components to the
input sample and using an Lp norm constraint to control the
amount of distortion.
3. Approach
In this section, we describe the proposed framework, the
networks, the architectures, and the attack scenarios.
3.1. Problem Statement
Spatial correlation between the adjacent locations in the
iris and the nature of the filters used in iris template gener-
ation, result in correlation between iris-code bits. Depend-
ing on the filters that are used in the template generation,
this correlation can be between the adjacent or non-adjacent
bits. For instance, in the case of the Gabor filter bank used
in [14], locations far away from each other can be highly
correlated. In addition, generating the natural iris image
from the iris-code is computationally expensive. Therefore,
directly altering the bits in the iris-code domain cannot be
an optimal solution to generating a physically feasible ad-
versarial iris example. To address this problem, we mimic
the iris-code generation with a deep auto-encoder surrogate
network under the reconstruction loss, as shown in Figure 2.
The trained iris-code surrogate network is then utilized to
generate the adversarial examples as shown in Figure 3(b).
In the paper, OSIRIS iris verification algorithm [14] is con-
sidered as the conventional iris verification framework. It
worths mentioning that the proposed framework can be cus-
tomized to be applied to the other conventional iris-code
based iris recognition algorithms [8, 30, 16].
3.2. Iris-Code Generation
Since the generation of an adversarial example frame-
work, requires the back-propagation of the gradient of the
adversarial loss with respect to the input image, we use an
auto-encoder based on the U-net architecture [23] to gener-
ate the iris-code. Inspired by [19, 31], the iris-code surro-
gate network is defined as a surrogate network which gen-
erates iris-codes that are similar to the iris-codes that are
generated by the conventional algorithm. As shown in Fig-
Figure 3: Iris adversarial example generation network: (a) The conventional iris-code algorithm is utilized to generate the
benign example, (b) The iris-code surrogate network transforms the benign example to generate the adversarial examples by
enforcing the adversarial loss. (c) The generated adversarial example is compared to a ground truth example from the gallery.
ure 2, the input sample for this network is the normalized
iris image, IN , concatenated in depth with the binary nor-
malized iris mask, IM . The output of the network is the
generated iris-code, Ts. This output is forced to be close to
the iris-code generated by the conventional algorithm, Ta,
using the following reconstruction loss:
Lrec = ||Ta − Ts||2. (1)
The details for the U-Net network used in our experiments
can be seen in Table 1. The encoding and decoding sub-
networks are trained with 2 × 2 and 1 × 1 stride sizes,
respectively. The output layers of the encoding layers are
concatenated in depth with the corresponding layers in the
decoding sub-network. Separable kernels [28] are consid-
ered for all the layers. The network is trained using batch
size 64. Batch normalization is applied on the outputs of all
the layers. A ReLU activation function is utilized for all the
layers except the deconv0 layer, where tanh is considered.
Finally, 64×512×6 output is reshaped to 384 × 512 to be
compatible to the iris-code.
Through the experimental results we can observe that
the proposed surrogate network can very closely mimic
the conventional iris-code generation algorithms. The er-
ror rate for the trained iris-code surrogate network is less
than 2%, which presents, the generated iris-code, Ts, to be
sufficiently similar to the conventional iris-code, Ta. Since
the output of the tanh activation function is in the [−1, 1]
range, prior to calculating Lrec, the output is normalized to
[0, 1], in order to have the same range as Ta.
Table 1: Iris-code deep surrogate network: The first five lay-
ers represent the encoding sub-network, while the next five
layers are the decoding layers. Conv and deconv represent
convolutional and deconvolutional layers, respectively.
layer kernel input output
conv1 4×4×64 64×512×2 32×256×64
conv2 4×4×128 32×256×64 16×128×128
conv3 4×4×256 16×128×128 8×64×256
conv4 4×4×512 8×64×256 4×32×256
conv5 4×4×512 4×32×256 2×16×512
deconv4 4×4×512 2×16×512 4×32×512
deconv3 4×4×256 4×32×(512 + 256) 8×64×256
deconv2 4×4×128 8×64×(256 + 256) 16×128×128
deconv1 4×4×64 16×128×(128 + 128) 32×256×64
deconv0 4×4×6 32×256×(64 + 64) 64×512×6
3.3. Adversarial Examples
After training the iris-code surrogate network to learn
the iris-code generation, the trained surrogate network is
utilized to generate the adversarial examples. It should be
noted that the weights and the parameters of this network
are not trained in this adversarial setup. Here, the input
to the surrogate network is the normalized iris image, IN ,
concatenated in depth with the normalized iris mask, IM .
In this setup, as can be seen in Figure 3(b), at each itera-
tion n, both the adversarial normalized iris image, I(n)N , and
normalized mask, I(n)M , are updated through enforcing the
adversarial loss, L(n)adv:
L
(n)
adv = ||Ta − T (n)s ||2, (2)
where T (n)s is the adversarial iris-code generated at the nth
iteration. The loss function is only calculated on the bits
which are not already flipped, i.e., locations where the bi-
narized values of T (n)s are equal to the values of Ta. The
adversarial setup to update I(n)N follows a clipped iGSM al-
gorithm [15]:
P : I
(0)
N = IN , I
(n)
N = Clip{I(n−1)N −  sign∇In−1
N
L
(n)
adv}. (3)
The clip function thresholds the values to make sure that
the values are inside [0, 1] range, sign represents the sign
function, and  indicates step size in each iteration of the
adversarial attack. The variable  limits each pixel’s maxi-
mum distance between the nth iteration and the (n − 1)th
iteration adversarial examples. Since the conventional iris-
code is a binary image, the normalized mask is also updated
during each step. Through these updates, the bits that are al-
ready saturated, are added to the normalized mask.
Q : I
(0)
M = IM , I
(n)
M (i) =

0 if I(n−1)M (i) = 0,
0 if I(n−1)N (i) = 0&IN (i) 6= 0,
0 if I(n−1)N (i) = 1&IN (i) 6= 1,
1 otherwise,
(4)
where, i represent the locations in the normalized iris and
mask images. The combination of this transformation and
computing the adversarial loss function over the bits that
are not flipped yet, results in a more accurate and realistic
adversarial attack. Adversarial training is continued until
the termination criteria is satisfied or the maximum number
of iterations is reached. Following the framework in [22],
the termination criteria isHD(IN , IN (n)) > δ, whereHD
represents the Hamming distance and δ is the recognition
threshold. Since a Hamming distance of 0.32 results in
False Match Rate of about 0.0001%, we select δ = 0.32.
Finally, the final generated adversarial iris, I∗N , along
with the normalized iris mask, IM , are compared with a the
ground truth iris image, which consists of a normalized iris
image, IgN , and its corresponding normalized iris mask, I
g
M ,
from the gallery. This comparison can be performed using
the whole iris-code , which we refer to as the first scenario,
or a series of bits from locations in the iris-code. We in-
vestigate the scenario in which these locations are known to
the attacker in the second scenario. The third scenario ex-
amines the performance of the proposed framework when
these locations are not revealed to the attacker.
3.4. Attack Scenarios
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed non-
targeted adversarial framework, three attack scenarios are
considered. The first attack scenario focuses on the whole
adversarial iris-code. In this scenario, Hamming distance
between the generated adversarial iris-code, T ∗s , which cor-
responds to I∗N and IM , and the ground truth iris-code, T
g
a ,
which corresponds to IgN and I
g
M , is considered as the ver-
ification criteria. In the second scenario, bits from a set
of locations, v, known by the attacker in the generated ad-
versarial iris-code, are compared to the bits from the same
locations in the ground truth iris-code, using Hamming dis-
tance. To train the adversarial example in the second sce-
nario more specifically, the adversarial loss in (2) is altered
to present the distance between bits in these locations in Ta
and T (n)s :
L
(n)
adv = ||Ta(v)− T (n)s (v)||2. (5)
The third scenario investigates the possibility of generat-
ing adversarial examples when the locations of the bits se-
lected to verify the adversarial example are not known by
the attacker. In this scenario, the adversarial loss is the
same as (2). We investigate the possibility of targeted at-
tacks to iris-codes using the same three scenarios. In this
framework, the adversarial loss function is altered to force
its corresponding iris-code to move closer to the target iris-
code,which represents a different subject:
L
(n)
adv = −||T tara − T (n)s ||2, (6)
where T tara represents the target iris-code, obtained from
the conventional iris-code algorithm.
4. Experimental Setup
In the experimental setup, to evaluate the performance
of the proposed algorithm, OSIRIS iris verification algo-
rithm [14] is considered as the conventional framework.
This algorithm considers a filter bank of six Gabor filters.
The normalized iris and mask images are of size 64 × 512.
This algorithm generates binary images of size 384×512 as
the iris-codes. In our framework, ADAM solver for stochas-
tic optimization [13] is used to train the surrogate network.
All the optimizations are conducted using mini-batch of size
64 and learning rate of 10−4. Two dataset are considered in
this experimental setup. The iris-code surrogate network
is trained on the BioCop dataset [1], then the adversarial
framework is tested on the BIOMDATA dataset [5]. The
iris-code surrogate network is trained using 10, 000 pairs of
normalized iris and mask images. The adversarial frame-
work is tested using 3, 040 iris images from 231 subjects.
4.1. Results and Discussion
Table 2(a) presents the average distance and the number
of iterations required to generate adversarial examples for
the non-targeted framework for three scenarios. The dis-
tance is defined as:
dist =
||IN − I∗N ||2∑
IM
, (7)
Table 2: The average distance between the benign and ad-
versarial examples and the average number of iterations re-
quired for the successful non-targeted and targeted attacks.
(a) Non-targeted framework
scenario1 scenario2 scenario3
 dist #itr dist #itr dist #itr
0.03 0.003139 2.08 0.002689 2.14 0.004834 2.54
0.02 0.001835 2.40 0.001503 2.70 0.003255 3.36
0.01 0.000963 3.76 0.000627 4.12 0.001894 5.62
0.007 0.000760 4.90 0.000450 5.36 0.001554 7.50
0.005 0.000640 6.40 0.000352 6.96 0.001358 10.06
0.002 0.000480 14.12 0.000232 14.78 0.001087 23.32
0.001 0.000436 27.16 0.000200 27.44 0.001015 45.74
0.0007 0.000426 38.46 0.000191 38.22 0.000988 64.68
0.0005 0.000419 53.52 0.000187 52.92 0.000975 90.24
0.0002 0.000407 132.34 0.000180 130.08 0.000950 223.46
0.0001 0.000402 263.78 0.000177 258.26 0.000943 446.06
(b) Targeted framework
scenario1 scenario2 scenario3
 dist #itr dist #itr dist #itr
0.03 0.005166 2.72 0.004707 6.14 0.008151 6.80
0.02 0.003557 3.64 0.003326 7.38 0.005401 8.22
0.01 0.002113 6.10 0.001775 11.38 0.003273 12.40
0.007 0.001778 8.24 0.001436 14.70 0.002781 16.10
0.005 0.001540 10.96 0.001244 18.92 0.002399 20.10
0.002 0.001258 25.56 0.001007 40.74 0.002036 43.24
0.001 0.001166 49.76 0.000938 76.56 0.001921 79.72
0.0007 0.001141 70.54 0.000937 109.10 0.001891 110.80
0.0005 0.001123 98.24 0.000925 150.90 0.001884 152.78
0.0002 0.001099 243.78 0.000913 373.41 0.001875 372.32
0.0001 0.001091 486.28 0.000893 738.46 0.001885 740.08
where the denominator represents the number of 1 bits in
IM . For the second and third scenarios, 1024 bits from ran-
domly selected locations are considered. As can be seen
in this table, for each scenario, the number of iterations re-
quired to generate the adversarial example increases when
 decreases. On the other hand, the distance between these
two images decreases when the step size decreases. This in-
ference is due to the fact that smaller step sizes increase the
possibility that the perturbations added to a less important
pixel can cancel out during multiple steps. However, the
distance remains almost unchanged for step sizes smaller
than 0.001, while the average number of iterations required
to generate the adversarial example increases proportionally
with . In addition, as expected, the average distance in the
first scenario is more than the average distance in the sec-
ond scenario, since the attacker only needs to alter a subset
of the bits. On the other hand, the average distance in the
third scenario is more than the first two scenarios, since the
attacker does not have any knowledge about the locations of
the bits considered in the verification algorithm.
Table 2(b) presents the results for the targeted frame-
Table 3: The success rate for the first scenario on (a) non-
targeted and (b) targeted frameworks for different step sizes
when maximum number of possible iterations changes.
(a) Non-targeted framework
,#it 10 20 30 40 50 100 200 300
0.03 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.02 99.4 99.8 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.01 91.2 95.7 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.007 75.4 93.6 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.005 50.3 91.3 97.3 100 100 100 100 100
0.002 2.3 39.1 69.4 89.5 95.2 100 100 100
0.001 0 3.5 15.7 42.9 57.3 98.1 100 100
0.0007 0 0 6.1 13.8 30.5 87.1 100 100
0.0005 0 0 0 4.5 8.7 57.8 96.1 99.6
0.0002 0 0 0 0 0 5.3 45.6 74.1
0.0001 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.2 12.3
(b) Targeted framework
,#it 10 20 30 40 50 100 200 300
0.03 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.02 95.1 97.6 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.01 88.4 93.1 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.007 71.1 88.7 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.005 36.2 82.7 94.8 100 100 100 100 100
0.002 1.8 29.7 61.5 89.5 95.2 100 100 100
0.001 0 2.1 11.2 32.4 49.5 95.3 100 100
0.0007 0 0 4.3 10.1 22.7 83.7 92.1 100
0.0005 0 0 0 2.1 5.2 41.2 89.8 97.6
0.0002 0 0 0 0 0 4.4 38.7 61.3
0.0001 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.2 6.5
work. To consider a more realistic framework, for each
attack, we select the iris images that belongs to the same
eye, left or right, to increase the overlap between the nor-
malized iris masks. In this framework the perturbation is
added to a benign iris image is order to force it to generate
an iris-code close to the conventional iris-code from another
subject. Here, we consider δ = 0.25 as the termination
constraint, while δ = 0.32 is considered as the verification
threshold. In this framework the distance is defined as:
dist =
||IN − I∗N ||2∑
IM ∩ ItarM
, (8)
where ItarM is the normalized mask image for the target iris
image. Here, the denominator represents the number of pix-
els in which both normalized iris mask images are equal to
1. As shown in this table, although the number of iterations
and the total amount of perturbation required to generate the
adversarial example increases compared to the non-targeted
framework, the overall trend of the parameters with respect
to the step size is similar to the non-targeted framework.
Table 3(a) presents the adversarial attack success-rate for
different  values and the maximum number of iterations
Figure 4: (a) The benign example. Adversarial examples and normalized to [0, 1] absolute values of perturbation for non-
targeted (b) first and (c) second scenarios. (d) Two adversarial examples generated by the targeted first scenario. The benign
iris is transformed to the images in the second row and verified as subjects represented by the iris images in the top row.
in the first scenario for the non-targeted framework. The
success-rate is defined as the percentage of successful at-
tacks, given the maximum number of allowed iteration and
the randomly chosen ground truth iris image. The maxi-
mum number of allowed iterations is directly proportional
to the maximum possible difference between the benign and
adversarial examples in each pixel. As expected, for small
values of the allowed iterations, the success-rate drops dras-
tically when the step size decreases. Table 3(b) presents the
success-rate for the first scenario in the targeted framework.
Compared to the non-targeted framework, the success-rate
drops drastically. However, the overall trend of the success-
rate is similar to the non-targeted framework.
Figure 4 presents benign and generated adversarial ex-
amples for targeted and non-targeted frameworks when  =
0.0002. As shown in this figure, the adversarial examples
are perceptually close to the benign examples, while rec-
ognized as a different subject. Figure 4(b) and (c) present
the adversarial example and normalized to [0, 1] absolute
value of perturbations for the non-targeted framework us-
ing first and second scenarios, respectively. For the second
scenario, also the total amount of the perturbation added to
the image is less, the perturbation is clustered in certain lo-
cations, while in the first scenario, the perturbation is more
smoothly distributed. Figure 4(d) presents two examples of
the targeted framework using the first scenario. Here, the
top iris images are the target images. The second row im-
ages, also perceptually very close to the benign image, are
verified as the subjects represented by target iris image.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we generated physical adversarial exam-
ples for code-based iris recognition systems. However, con-
ventional iris-code generation algorithms are not differen-
tiable with respect to the input image. Generating adversar-
ial examples requires back-propagation of the adversarial
loss. Therefore, we proposed to deploy a deep surrogate
auto-encoder network to generate iris-codes very similar to
iris-codes generated by conventional algorithm. The adver-
sarial network uses the trained surrogate network to gen-
erate the adversarial examples using fast gradient sign de-
scent algorithm. We examined the possibility of generating
non-targeted and targeted adversarial examples. Consider-
ing three white-box and black-box attack scenarios, the pro-
posed network was able to deceive the iris recognition sys-
tem, while the perturbation added to the benign examples
remain in the acceptable range.
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